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INTRODUCTION
The "Joe Camel" advertising campaign has been a bonanza for R.J.
Reynolds, with the company's cigarettes posting significant gains in market
share since the campaign's inception in 1988.1 However, that success has
brought controversy in its wake, particularly given disturbing evidence
suggesting that children may be attracted to smoking by the cartoon
imagery and the debonair demeanor of Old Joe.2 In a much-cited example,
one study revealed that six-year-old children were as familiar with Joe
Camel as they were with Mickey Mouse.' As a response to the success of
the "smooth character" campaign, legislation was introduced in 1990 to ban
the cartoon-like' advertising typified by Joe Camel.4 Although this
legislation failed to pass the subcommittee stage,5 the campaign to rein in
Old Joe continued, with the focus shifting to the Federal Trade Commission
(FTC), which considered administrative action that would eliminate the ads
entirely.6 In June 1994, by a three-to-two vote of its commissioners, the
FTC decided to close its investigation of the Camel campaign.7 The
majority explained that "[a]lthough it may seem intuitive to some that the
Joe Camel advertising campaign would lead more children to smoke or lead
1. Laura Bird, Joe Smooth for President, ADWEEK'S MARKETING WK., May 20, 1991,
at 20, 20.
2. See, e.g., Joseph R. DiFranza et al., RJR Nabisco's Cartoon Camel Promotes Camel
Cigarettes to Children, 266 JAMA 3149 (1991); Paul M. Fischer et al., Brand Logo
Recognition by Children Aged 3 to 6 Years: Mickey Mouse and Old Joe the Camel, 266
JAMA 3145 (1991); John P. Pierce et al., Does Tobacco Advertising Target Young People
to Start Smoking?, 266 JAMA 3154 (1991).
3. Fischer et al., supra note 2, at 3145, 3147-48.
4. H.R. 5041, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. (1990).
5. See Rep. Henry Waxman, Tobacco Marketing: Profiteering From Children, 266
JAMA 3185, 3185-86 (1991); House Subcommittee Approves Strong Anti-tobacco Measure,
48 CQ WKLY REP. 2922, 2922 (Sept. 15, 1990).
6. See Stuart Auerbach, FTC Staff Takes Aim at 'Joe Camel': Reynolds Denies Ad
Campaign Is Aimed at Enticing Teens to Smoke, WASH. POST, Aug. 12, 1993, at D9; Jube
Shiver, Ban Urged on Camel Symbol in Tobacco Ads, L.A. TIMES, Aug. 12, 1993, at Dl.
7. FTC Closes Investigation of R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Company, FTC TODAY, June
8, 1994, available in LEXIS, Trade Library, FTC File No. 932-3162.
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children to smoke more, the evidence to support that intuition is not there
.... Because the evidence in the record does not provide reason to believe
that the law has been violated, we cannot issue a complaint."' The
dissenters countered that "[b]y refusing to bring such a case, the majority
has implicitly downplayed strong circumstantial evidence of an effect on
minors . ... There is evidence that the cartoon character has appeal to
minors and that Camel has increased its market share among minors."9
This Note analyzes whether the FTC legally could have undertaken
action against the Joe Camel advertising campaign. Part I reviews the
history of the FTC's statutory authority to regulate unfair business
practices. Part II recounts the efforts of the FTC to apply its power to the
regulation of commercial advertising and the congressional response it
provoked. Part I examines the current understanding of the FTC's
authority and considers an application of those powers against the Camel
advertisements. Finally, Part IV explores constitutional limitations that may
constrain FTC action in this area. This Note concludes that, under existing
regulatory standards and and understanding of the limited constitutional
protection afforded advertising for products like cigarettes, a ban on Joe
Camel advertising could withstand both statutory and constitutional
challenges.
I. HISTORY OF TE FTC's POWER TO REGULATE UNFAIR
BUSINESS PRACTICES
A. The Original FTC Act
The statutory basis for the FTC's regulatory power over commercial
advertising derives from Section Five of the Federal Trade Commission
Act,' ° which provides in relevant part: "Unfair methods of competition...
and unfair or deceptive acts or practices in or affecting commerce, are
declared unlawful."" Originally, however, the FTC's grant of authority
was limited to "unfair methods of competition,"'" which reflected the
early understanding of the FTC's mission as dealing primarily with antitrust
8. FTC Statements Regarding RkJ. Reynolds Tobacco Company-Camel Cigarettes,
FTC TODAY, June 8, 1994, available in LEXIS, Trade Library, FTC File No. 932-3162.
9. Id. (dissenting statement of Commissioner Dennis A. Yao)..
10. 15 U.S.C. §§ 41-58 (1988 & Supp. V 1993).
11. 15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(1) (1988).
12. Federal Trade Commission Act, ch. 311, § 5, 38 Stat. 717, 719 (1914) (current
version at 15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(1) (1988)).
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regulation." The vagueness inherent in the term "unfair" vested consider-
able discretion in the FTC to determine what practices would come within
its purview. Congress was well aware of this vagueness when it passed the
Act and hoped that under judicial supervision, the FTC would formulate a
working definition through application. 4 A House Conference Report
summarized the legislative understanding:
It is impossible to frame definitions which embrace all unfair practices.
There is no limit to human inventiveness in this field. Even if all
known unfair practices were specifically defined and prohibited, it
would be at once necessary to begin over again. If Congress were to
adopt the method of definition, it would undertake an endless task. 5
Reflecting the limitation in the early statutory language and the
common understanding of its main mission,16 much of the FTC's early
unfairness work was focused on practices that were harmful to other
competitors within a market, as opposed to practices that affected
consumers directly. 7 Efforts by the FTC to expand its regulatory authority
beyond competing business concerns were rebuffed by the courts. In FTC
v. Raladam Co., the Supreme Court struck down an FTC attempt to prevent
a manufacturer from advertising its product as a scientific cure for
obesity. 8 The Court saw the problem as one of jurisdiction because the
FTC had not found that any of Raladam's competitors had been harmed by
the practice. 9 Dismissing the idea that the FTC's jurisdiction extended
beyond cases where harm to competitors had been demonstrated, the Court
stated: "Unfair trade methods are not per se unfair methods of competition
.... The unfair methods must be such as injuriously affect or tend thus to
affect the business of (an offending company's) competitors. '
13. See Neil W. Averitt, The Meaning of "Unfair Acts or Practices" in Section 5 of the
Federal Trade Commission Act, 70 GEO. L.J. 225, 230 (1981) (citing H.R. REP. No. 533,
63d Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 1, at 2 (1914)).
14. Id. at 226.
15. H.R. CONF. REP. No. 1142, 63d Cong., 2d Sess. 19 (1914).
16. See supra notes 12-13 and accompanying text.
17. This facet of the FTC's work is beyond the scope of this Note. For a general
discussion, see Averitt, supra note 13.
18. Raladam, 283 U.S. 643 (1931). The FTC had issued a "cease & desist" order,
authorized by 15 U.S.C. § 45(c). Id. at 646.
19. The FTC simply drew the conclusion, without evidence to'support it, that the
practice was harmful to competitive and public interests. Id at 646.
20. Id. at 649; see also FTC v. Gratz, 253 U.S. 421,427 (1920) (holding the FTC could
not enjoin merchants from refusing to sell cotton ties unless purchaser also bought bagging
because practice involved no "deception, bad faith, fraud, or oppression" on part of seller);
FTC v. Curtis Publishing Co., 260 U.S. 568, 582 (1923) (holding the FTC could not prevent
publishing company from enforcing exclusivity provisions of agency contracts with
distributors because practice had "long been recognized as proper and unobjectionable").
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This narrow view of the FTC's jurisdictional mandate faded somewhat
in FTC v. R.F. Keppel & Bro., Inc.21 In Keppel, the FTC had sought to
bring to a halt a candy manufacturer's practice of including lottery-type
inducements within the candy's packaging as violative of public policy
because it encouraged gambling by children.' The jurisdictional issue
arose because any of the manufacturer's competitors were free to include
the same inducement in their packaging, so the practice was not "unfair"
in the sense of placing other manufacturers at a competitive disadvan-
tage.' Nonetheless, the Supreme Court sustained the FTC action, ruling
that the FTC's jurisdiction was not limited to actions likely to have
anticompetitive consequences.24 Eschewing the idea that the concept of
unfairness could be constrained within "fixed and unyielding categories,"
the Court instead looked to whether "the practice is of the sort which the
common law and criminal statutes have long deemed contrary to public
policy.""s The Court has subsequently noted that Keppel "sets the standard
by which the range of FTC jurisdiction is to be measured today."27
B. Confirmation of a Greater Consumer Protection Role: From
Wheeler-Lea to Sperry
While the courts were allowing the FTC greater latitude in asserting
its unfairness jurisdiction, Congress was also taking steps to expand the
Commission's jurisdiction. These efforts culminated in the Wheeler-Lea
amendment to the Federal Trade Commission Act.2 The amendment gave
the FTC authority to regulate "unfair or deceptive acts or practices," and
was designed to relieve the FTC of the burden of demonstrating competi-
tive harm in unfairness proceedings,29 as well as to allow the Commission
21. Keppel, 291 U.S. 304 (1934).
22. Id. at 308.
23. Id.
24. Id. at 314. The case signaled a trend toward significant judicial deference to the
FrC in defining the contours of "unfair" when the FTC's findings are supported by the
evidence. Id.
25. Id. at 310.
26. Id. at 313. The case is also noteworthy because of the Court's reference to the idea
of special unfairness protection where children are involved. "[M-]ere the competitive method
is shown to exploit consumers, children, who are unable to protect themselves .... Such
devices have met with condemnation throughout the community." Id. Keppel serves as well
to illustrate the Court's early understanding of the difference between the FTC's power with
respect to deceptive, as opposed to unfair, practices: "[W]e may take it that [Keppel's
candy-packaging practice] does not involve any fraud or deception." Id. at 309; see infra
notes 31-32.
27. FTC v. Sperry & Hutchinson Co., 405 U.S. 233, 242 (1972).
28. Wheeler-Lea Amendment, ch. 49, §3, 52 Stat. 111 (1938).
29. Averitt, supra note 13, at 234.
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to focus more directly on consumer injury than it had previously done.3"
This more expansive view of the FTC's consumer protection role was
recognized by the Supreme Court in FTC v. Sperry & Hutchinson Co.,3
where the Court held that the FTC was empowered to sit "like a court of
equity" in determining whether a given practice was unfair.32 The Court
further noted that Wheeler-Lea had "charged the FTC with protecting
consumers as well as competitors,"33 thus laying to rest any doubt that the
FTC's regulatory power extended beyond merely policing competition
among rivals and encompassed actions impacting consumers directly.
II. THE FTC's EFFORTS TO REGULATE COMMERCIAL
ADVERTISING AND THE CONGRESSIONAL RESPONSE
A. Efforts to Develop Standards of Unfairness
When the FTC's jurisdiction was thought to be limited to anti-
competitive activity injurious to competition, the concept of direct
unfairness to consumers was almost by definition of minimal practical
import. However, with the passage of the Wheeler-Lea Amendment and the
broadened understanding of the FTC's authority, the bounds of the term
"unfair" and the power it granted took on added significance. Although the
FTC did not immediately begin a vigorous enforcement of its unfairness
mandate,34 by 1964 it had developed three criteria to consider when
probing for consumer unfairness: (1) whether the practice injures con-
sumers, (2) whether the practice violates established public policy, and (3)
whether the practice is unethical or unscrupulous. 5 In Sperry, the
Supreme Court tacitly approved these criteria,36 and Congress made
explicit the power of the FTC to promulgate standards of unfairness with
the passage of the Magnuson-Moss Warranty-Federal Trade Commission
Improvement Act, which authorized the FTC to prescribe "interpretive
30. Id. at 234 n.63.
31. Sperry, 405 U.S. 233 (1972).
32. Id. at 244.
33. Id.
34. During much of this time, enforcement was focused on "deceptive" practices. See
generally Averitt, supra note 13. While the FTC's power to correct "deceptive" practices
is contained in the same phrase that gives rise to its unfairness authority, the powers are not
considered coterminous ("unfair or deceptive acts or practices... are declared unlawful.")
15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(1) (1988). See Commission Statement of Policy on the Scope of
Consumer Unfairness Jurisdiction, 4 Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH) 13,203, at 20,907 (June 23,
1988) [hereinafter Policy Statement].
35. Policy Statement, supra note 34, at 20,908.
36. Sperry, 405 U.S. at 244 n.5.
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rules, general statements of policy, and substantive trade regulation rules
with respect to unfair or deceptive acts."37
B. Enforcement of the Unfairness Standard in the Advertising
Context
The FTC's application of unfairness concepts to commercial
advertising began in earnest with the Cigarette Rule,38 which served as the
forum by which the FTC articulated the general unfairness standards listed
above. There, the FTC concluded that the failure to include health warnings
on cigarette advertising was unfair under these criteria.39
Throughout the 1970s, the FTC utilized its broadened mandate to
successfully bring a number of actions against advertisers, often on the
basis that their advertisements were unfair because they either posed a risk
of physical harm to children or enticed children to engage in risky or
dangerous activities. In In re General Foods Corp., for example, the FTC
won a consent decree from the maker of Post Grape Nuts to take off the
air an advertisement showing a known naturalist picking and eating berries,
in part on the ground that the ad would "have the tendency or capacity to
influence children to engage in behavior which is harmful or involves the
risk of harm." A similar result was reached in In re Mego International,
where the FTC initiated action against the manufacturer of a Cher doll on
the grounds that an ad showing a child using an electric dryer without the
parent visible on-screen could cause children to use "electrical personal
grooming devices without the close and watchful supervision of an
adult." ' Given the significant grant of definitional discretion delegated to
the FTC by the Magnuson-Moss Act, advertisers had little hope of
37. H.R. CONF. REP. No. 1606, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 31 (1974). The Act also expanded
the FTC's jurisdiction to include matters "affecting commerce." Id.
38. 16 C.F.R. § 408 (1965).
39. The Cigarette Rule was also based in large part on a deception theory. 29 Fed. Reg.
8324, 8350-54 (1964).
40. General Foods Corp., 86 F.T.C. 831, 832 (1975).
41. Mego International, 92 F.T.C. 186, 187 (1978). See also Philip Morris, Inc., 82
F.T.C. 16 (1973) (approving consent decree to cease distributing unsolicited razor blades
directly to homes: "[T]he distribution of the razor blades.., constitutes a hazard to the
health and safety of persons... particularly young children."); Uncle Ben's, 89 F.T.C. 131
(1977) (approving consent decree to cease airing ads showing children in proximity to foods
being cooked or trying to cook without adult supervision). For an example of a (futilely)
contested FTC unfairness action where the agency's rationale did not rely on particular
danger to children, see Pfizer, 81 F.T.C. 23 (1972).
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prevailing once an action had been initiated, and often found it most
advantageous merely to settle.42
III. APPLICATION OF THE FTC's UNFAmNESS STANDARD TO JOE
CAMEL ADVERTISING
Although the FTC's three-part unfairness test has never been formally
codified, courts have utilized the three factors to review FTC unfairness
rulings, 43 and FTC action against Joe Camel advertising would properly
be analyzed under these terms.
A. Consumer Injury
Consumer injury is the most important of the three factors to consider
when evaluating a possible unfairness action because a finding of consumer
injury can, even absent the presence of the other unfairness criteria, suffice
to warrant a finding of unfairness. 44 To bring about an unfairness
determination, an injury must be: (1) substantial, (2) not outweighed by any
countervailing benefits to consumers or competition, and (3) one that
consumers themselves could not reasonably have avoided.45
1. Substantiality of the Injury
To determine whether Joe Camel advertising causes a substantial
injury, it is necessary to delineate with some precision exactly what
"injury" there is. To be sure, smoking itself causes injury. Estimates are
that over four hundred thousand deaths per year can be directly traced to
42. As the FTC asserted its consumer unfairness authority more forcefully, reaction to
its approach, which had initially been very favorable (as evidenced by the passage of the
Magnuson-Moss Act), began to change for the worse. Concerns about the lack of discernible
standards, see, e.g., William Erxleben, The FTC"s Kaleidoscopic Unfairness Statute: Section
5, 10 GONZ. L. REv. 333 (1975); Caswell Hobbs, Unfairness at the FTC-The Legacy of
S&H, 47 ANTiTRUST L.J. 1023 (1978); Teresa Schwartz, Regulating Unfair Practices Under
the FTC Act: The Need for a Legal Standard, 11 AKRON L. REV. 1 (1977), coupled with
controversial FTC actions in the unfairness area, see, e.g., Children's Advertising, Notice
of Proposed Rulemaking, 43 FBD. REG. 17967 (1978), led to a call for a reining in of the
FTC's power. The decline of the "consumerism" movement of the early 1970s has also been
cited as a reason for this change. See Richard Craswell, The Identification of Unfair Acts
and Practices by the Federal Trade Commission, 1981 WIs. L. REV. 107, 108. As a result,
Congress in 1980 suspended the FTC's authority to initiate any proceedings against
commercial advertisers on the ground of unfairness. Pub. L. No. 96-252, 94 Stat. 374
(1980). This prohibition was extended for one year by Pub. L. No. 97-377 (1981), but was
not extended thereafter.
43. See, e.g., Orkin Exterminating Co. v. FTC, 849 F.2d 1354 (3d Cir. 1988); American
Fin. Serv. v. FTC, 767 F.2d 957 (D.C. Cir. 1985).
44. Policy Statement, supra note 34, at 20,908.
45. Id. at 20,908-09.
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smoking." However, to make the inferential step from saying that
smoking causes injury to saying that Joe Camel advertising can be banned
as unfair because it causes injury requires a somewhat different conclusion.
It would have to be shown that advertising causes consumption of
cigarettes, thereby causing the injury, and that Joe Camel advertising is
somehow different from and more harmful than other types of cigarette
advertising.
Whether advertising of cigarettes causes an increase in their
consumption has been a subject of significant scientific and marketing
literature. 47 Results of these studies have shown a correlation or relation
between advertising and cigarette consumption, but have not conclusively
demonstrated that advertising causes an increase in demand for cigar-
ettes.48 Certainly, this is consistent with the position of the tobacco
industry, which claims that its advertising is aimed solely at affecting brand
choice among individuals who already smoke.49 However, the FTC need
not have conclusive evidence of the causal connection for its finding to be
upheld. Courts give significant deference to an FTC factual finding,"0 and
thus would likely uphold an FTC conclusion that there is a causal link
between cigarette advertising and consumption.
Another somewhat related basis by which the FTC could conclude
that cigarette advertising causes an increase in consumption is the theory
46. Death Toll From Smoking Is Rising, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 1, 1991, at A9, A14.
47. See, e.g., James J. Boddewyn, There is No Convincing Evidence for a Relationship
Between Cigarette Advertising and Consumption, 84 BRIT. J. ADDICTION 1255 (1989); Jane
Chetwynd et al., The Influence of.Advertising on Tobacco Consumption: A Reply to Jackson
& Ekelund, 84 BRrr. J. ADDICTION 1251 (1989); John D. Jackson & Robert B. Ekelund, The
Influence ofAdvertising on Tobacco Consumption: Some Problems With Chetwynd et al. 's
Analysis, 84 BRIT. J. ADDICTION 1247 (1989).
48. The scientific debate has been marked in part by a somewhat partisan tone:
Both groups [the tobacco industry and smoking control advocates] enthusiastically
cite and publicize research papers whose conclusions support their own policy and
political interests and attack the methodology or funding of studies which do not
please them. Few witnessing these debates are in any position to assess the
credibility of the arguments advanced, with the ascendant view at any given time
likely to more reflect presentational skill than the substance of the research under
discussion.
Simon Chapman, The Limitations ofEconometric Analysis in Cigarette Advertising Studies,
84 BRrr. J. ADDICTION 1267 (1989). It is therefore relevant that it was a group of
anti-smoking researchers that recently observed, "[D]ata on the direct effects of cigarette
advertising on demand for cigarettes are inconclusive. Econometric studies show little or no
effects of cigarette advertising on overall demand for cigarettes." Michael Klitzner et al.,
Cigarette Advertising and Adolescent Experimentation With Smoking, 86 BRrr. J.
ADDIcTION 287, 288 (1991).
49. See Fischer et al., supra note 2, at 3145.
50. See FTC v. Indiana Fed'n of Dentists, 476 U.S. 447, 454 (1986).
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that it targets children and adolescents. This has been a particular focus of
the scientific literature,"1 and it would allow the FTC to consider other
relevant factors, such as the fact that the cigarette industry is unique in its
requirement of finding new smokers. Each year one million smokers quit
and almost four hundred thousand die from tobacco-related illnesses.5 2 In
the absence of new smokers, the industry would be unable to sustain itself.
Further, the decision whether to start smoking is made at a particularly
early age: 99 percent of all smokers start before age twenty, and 60 percent
start before age fifteen.53 Given these facts, along with the astronomical
amount of money spent on cigarette advertising,54 it is simply not credible
that the sole purpose of cigarette advertising is to convince those already
smoking to switch brands, especially given the low elasticity of brand
preference relative to advertising in the. cigarette category.55
The idea of focusing on injury to children would further provide a
basis for singling out Joe Camel advertising. Joe Camel has been
demonstrated to appeal to children. For example, in a recent study, six-
year-old children were shown to be as familiar with the Joe Camel logo
(i.e., these children could match a picture showing just Joe Camel, with no
reference to brand or product, with a picture of a cigarette) as they were
with a Mickey Mouse logo.56 Further, Joe Camel recognition rates were
significantly higher than those for the Marlboro Many In another study,
teenagers exposed to Joe Camel advertising were shown to have higher
recall and recognition of the ad than adults, and also found the ads more
appealing than adults did.58
In sum, it has been shown that children see, remember, and respond
positively to Joe Camel. Further, Camel brand-share among the under-
eighteen market has risen from half a percent before Joe Camel to almost
33 percent now.59 Sales to the under-eighteen market have been estimated
to account for about one-quarter of all Camel sales.' R.J. Reynolds claims
that the ads are targeted to smokers in their early twenties,61 but docu-
51. See supra notes 2 and 47.
52. Kenneth Polin, Argument for the Ban of Tobacco Advertising: A First Amendment
Analysis, 17 HOFSTRA L. Rnv. 99, 110 (1988) (citing the Surgeon General's findings).
53. Id.
54. Id.
55. See Fischer et al., supra note 2, at 3148.
56. Id. at 3147.
57. Id. at 3146.
58. DiFranza et al., supra note 2, at 3151.
59. Id. at 3151.
60. Auerbach, supra note 6, at D9.
61. DiFranza et al., supra note 2, at 3149.
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ments from a recent case suggest that the industry is aware of the effect its
advertising has on children.62 The FTC has noted that "unwarranted health
and safety risks" are among the types of injuries which may warrant a
finding of unfairness.63 If the FTC found that Joe Camel advertising
caused consumer injury by causing children to smoke, the deferential nature
of judicial review of administrative fact findings suggests this would be
upheld.
2. Countervailing Benefits
The FTC has said that it will look at whether a practice is "injurious
in its net effects" in making a determination of unfairness.' In other
words, if a practice causes injury, it will still not be found to be unfair if
the costs of a remedy would exceed the costs brought about by the practice.
However, in the case of Joe Camel advertising, it is difficult to discern any
tangible countervailing benefit. The Supreme Court has noted that much of
the value of commercial speech is found in its informational value.65 Yet
to characterize Joe Camel as providing any "informational value" is to
stretch that term farther than it was perhaps meant to be stretched. Further,
by the omission of almost all specific product information (other than that
required by law) and the substitution of cartoon imagery, the informational
value of Joe Camel has been reduced to an absolute minimum. Indeed, it
would not be difficult to characterize these omissions as having a negative
informational value, since they obfuscate the factual data that one would
expect to play a role in consumer decision making.66 Countervailing
societal benefits, therefore, do not outweigh the injury caused by Joe
Camel.
3. Ability of Consumers to Avoid Injury
The basis of the FTC's focus on the ability of consumers to avoid
injury is the belief that the market is "self-correcting ... we rely on
consumer choice-the ability of individual consumers to make their own
private purchasing decisions without regulatory intervention-to govern the
62. See FTC in a Bind Over Cigarette Ads, CM. TRI., Aug. 12, 1993, at N22 (quoting
RI.. Reynolds spokesperson).
63. Policy Statement, supra note 34, at 20,908.
64. Id. at 20,909.
65. "Society may also have a strong interest in the free flow of commercial information
.... Advertising, however tasteless and excessive it sometimes may seem, is nevertheless
dissemination of information as to who is producing and selling what product, for what
reason, and at what price." Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Council,
Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 763-64 (1977).
66. See Polin, supra note 52, at 101.
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market."'67 To the extent that Joe Camel advertising entices children or
adolescents to begin smoking, this "market correction" concept does not
apply. Once a child begins smoking, he is exposing himself to a drug that
is more addictive than heroin,6" and which causes many deaths each year
as well as illnesses ranging from cardiovascular disease to many forms of
cancer.69 It may be true that adults can rationally make this kind of
choice, and we certainly do not want to reduce the adult population to
viewing only that which is suitable for children,7 but when an advertise-
ment for a product that is illegal for children to use uniquely appears to
target children, and indeed, is more effective at promoting that product to
children than to adults, it seems logical to expect that many children will
be lured in. Once they become smokers, the odds are they will stay
smokers.7
1
B. Established Public Policy
Although the FTC focuses primarily on consumer injury when making
an unfairness evaluation,72 it will also look to public policy.73 Occasion-
ally, violation of public policy will serve as evidence that an injury is
present, but more often it is used to ascertain whether an FTC finding of
injury to consumers is in accord with legislative and judicial determinations
in the area.74 Public policy analysis thus serves primarily as a supple-
mental, rather than an independent, criterion of unfairness evaluation.
Insofar as Joe Camel advertising encourages children to smoke, one
need look no further than the laws against selling tobacco products to
minors to find a public policy supporting an unfairness action.7' This is
not to say that these laws show evidence of an independent ground for an
unfairness action. If the states want to prevent children from seeing Joe
Camel ads, they are certainly as capable of trying to prohibit them as is the
FTC, at least in the abstract. Rather, it merely suggests that the general and
67. Policy Statement, supra note 34, at 20,909.
68. Board of Trustees, Report 6: Tobacco Product Liability, 255 JAMA 1034, 1034
(1986) (quoting former Director of National Institute of Drug Abuse).
69. L.O. Gostin & A.M. Brandt, Criteria for Evaluating a Ban on the Advertising of
Cigarettes, 269 JAMA 904, 905 (1993).
70. FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726, 760 (1978) (Powell, J., concurring).
71. Polin, supra note 52, at 110.
72. Policy Statement, supra note 34, at 20,908.
73. Id. at 20,909. "Public Policy" is defined in the Policy Statement as including that
which "has been established by statute, common law, industry practice, or otherwise." Id.
74. Policy Statement, supra note 34, at 20,909 to 20,909-2.
75. See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 308 pt. 1 title 9, ch. 7 (Deering 1993) ($500 fine for
first violation); OHIO REv. CODE ANN. 29 § 2927.02 (Anderson 1993) (third degree
misdemeanor); NY PUB. HEALTH § 1399-aa, -dd (McKinney 1993).
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well-established policy against underage smoking is an indication that the
FTC can focus on the injury Joe Camel has on children as (illicit)
consumers of cigarettes.
C. Is the Practice Unethical or Unscrupulous?
Although the element of unethical or unscrupulous conduct was
included by the FTC in its Policy Statement, the FTC noted that "[c]onduct
that is truly unethical or unscrupulous will almost always injure consumers
or violate public policy as well."76 For that reason, the FTC will not rely
on this element as a basis for a finding of unfairness, but that does not
mean that the FTC will need to be blind to the obvious unscrupulousness
of advertising cigarettes to children, or the (perhaps) even more egregious
action of denying it while doing it."
IV. CONSTITUTIONAL IMPLICATIONS OF AN FTC UNFAmNESS
PROCEEDING AGAINST JOE CAMEL
Assuming that a ban on Joe Camel advertising is within the statutory
power of the FTC, the constitutional implications of such an action must
be considered. To do this, it will be helpful to trace the development of the
Supreme Court's understanding of the unique position of commercial
speech within the First Amendment spectrum.
A. Development of the Commercial Speech Doctrine
Constitutional protection for commercial speech is of relatively recent
origin.7" Traditionally, it was held by the Court to be outside the purview
76. Policy Statement, supra note 34, at 20,909-03.
77. Shiver, supra note 6, at D12 (quoting RJ. Reynolds spokesperson-"If we believed
for a minute that the Camel ad induces children to smoke, we wouldn't wait for the FTC
or anyone else to act. We would immediately change the campaign.").
78. The Supreme Court has struggled somewhat to develop precise boundaries around
what constitutes "commercial speech." As Justice Stevens noted, it is not an unimportant
issue, "[b]ecause 'commercial speech' is afforded less constitutional protection than other
forms of speech, it is important that the commercial speech concept not be defined too
broadly, lest speech deserving of greater constitutional protection be inadvertently
suppressed." Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557, 579
(1980) (Stevens, J., concurring) (citation omitted). In Bolger v. Youngs Drug Prods. Corp.,
463 U.S. 60 (1983), the Court articulated three definitional factors, not all of which were
required: (1) the speech is a paid-for advertisement, (2) that refers to a specific product, and
(3) that is published in the economic interest of the speaker. Id. at 66-67. This Note treats
the Joe Camel campaign as falling within the rubric of commercial speech, though it should
be noted that other types of speech by tobacco companies related to their products seem to
tread close to the line between commercial and non-commercial speech. In R.J. Reynolds,
113 F.T.C. 344 (1986), the FTC complained against publication by a tobacco company of
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of the First Amendment.79 In Virginia State Board of Pharmacy v.
Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, however, the Court extended First
Amendment protection to consumer speech, holding that "truthful
information about entirely lawful activity" could not be completely
suppressed by a state." Taking note of the "common sense differences"
between commercial speech and other forms of expression, the Court
extended a lesser degree of protection to commercial speech than core
political speech receives. 1 For example, it suggested that protection of
commercial speech hinged on its truth and expressed tolerance for labeling
requirements and consumer warnings. 2
The Court refined its test for evaluating restrictions on commercial
speech in Central Hudson Gas & Electric Corp. v. Public Service Commis-
sion.83 The Court in Central Hudson articulated a four-part test to evaluate
restrictions on commercial speech. First, the speech at issue "must concern
lawful activity and not be misleading" to come within the protection of the
Constitution at all." Second, if the speech is protected, the government
must assert a substantial interest in restricting it.85 Third, the restriction
must directly advance the asserted interest.86 Fourth, the restriction must
be no more restrictive than necessary to advance the interest.87
B. Subsequent Reductions in the Protection Afforded Commercial
Speech
The Central Hudson test, though purportedly derived from the
Virginia Pharmacy analysis, was in fact seen by some as a substantial
lessening in the protection afforded commercial speech.8 In Posadas de
an ad titled Of Cigarettes and Science which purported to cast doubt on the uniformity
within the scientific community about the dangers of smoking. The company asserted that
the ad was not commercial speech, but fully protected comment on an issue of public
concern. Id. The suit was settled by consent decree. The definitional ambiguities as they
relate to product health claims are highlighted in Martin H. Redish, Product Health Claims
and the First Amendment: Scientific Expression and the Twilight Zone of Commercial
Speech, 43 VAND. L. REV. 1433 (1990).
79. See, e.g., Valentine v. Chrestensen, 316 U.S. 52 (1942).
80. Virginia Pharmacy, 425 U.S. 748, 773 (1976).
81. Id. at 771-72 n.24.
82. Id.
83. Central Hudson, 447 U.S. 557 (1980).
84. Id. at 566.
85. Id.
86. Id.
87. Id.
88. Among the doubters was the author of Virginia Pharmacy himself. "I believe the
test now evolved and applied by the Court is not consistent with our prior cases and does
not provide adequate protection for truthful, non-misleading, non-coercive commercial
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Puerto Rico Assoc. v. Tourism Co. of Puerto Rico, 9 the Court dealt yet
another blow to the strength of the commercial speech doctrine. Posadas
involved a ban on advertising for casino gambling construed by the
Superior Court of Puerto Rico to apply only to ads directed to residents of
Puerto Rico, as opposed to tourists." Casino gambling was a legal activity
in Puerto Rico for both tourists and residents, so the ads clearly came
within the first prong of the Central Hudson test.9" The casinos argued
that, since the underlying activity was legal, advertising for the activity
could not be suppressed completely.92 The Court flatly rejected this,
stating, "[T]he greater power to completely ban casino gambling necessarily
includes the lesser power to ban advertising of casino gambling."'93 Taken
to its logical extreme, this argument would in effect permit the state to ban
almost any type of commercial advertising, at least that which does not
relate to the exercise of a constitutionally-protected right.94
Another significant lessening in the scrutiny of commercial speech
regulations occurred in Board of Trustees v. Fox.' Relying on the
"subordinate position [of commercial speech] in the scale of First
Amendment values,"96 the Court in Fox concluded that the fourth prong
of Central Hudson did not require a legislature to use the least-restrictive
means when restricting commercial speech, but instead required only that
a "fit" be established between the end sought and the means used to
achieve it." Since the means analysis had been the main vehicle through
which the Court had invalidated restrictions on commercial speech,98 the
speech." Id. at 573 (Blackmun, J., concurring). In support of the argument that Central
Hudson represented an outright rejection of the anti-paternalism theme of Virginia
Pharmacy, see Krista L. Edwards, Comment, First Amendment Values and the Constitution-
al Protection of Tobacco Advertising, 82 Nw. U. L. REV. 145, 153 (1987).
89. Posadas, 478 U.S. 328 (1986).
90. Id. at 336.
91. Id. at 340-41.
92. Id. at 345.
93. Id. at 345-46.
94. The Court distinguished cases involving the exercise of constitutionally-protected
rights. See, e.g., Carey v. Population Servs. Int'l, 431 U.S. 678 (1977) (recognizing a
constitutional right to abortion).
95. Fox, 492 U.S. 469 (1989).
96. Id. at 478.
97. Id. at 480.
98. The Court used the fourth prong to invalidate the regulation at issue in Central
Hudson itself. Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557,
569-70 (1980). It also played a role in the decision in Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v.
Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 772 n.24 (1976) (citing examples
of restrictions short of a ban, such as warning labels and disclaimers).
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weakening of this part of the Central Hudson test represented a significant
retreat from vigorous application of the test.
C. Application of the Central Hudson Test to Joe Camel
Advertising
1. Is the Speech Related to Lawful Activity and Not Deceptive or
Misleading?
Cigarette smoking is, of course, a lawful activity. The type of
"deception" arguably involved in cigarette advertising-depicting cigarette
smoking as associated with healthful, active lifestyles, while failing to
discuss the health risks associated with smoking-is not likely to be
considered deceptive or misleading, absent overtly false health claims made
in a given ad.99 Advertising cigarettes to children, on the other hand,
would certainly not be related to lawful activity. However, given that the
tobacco industry continues to deny that its advertising targets children, it
is unlikely that this rationale could be used to deny Joe Camel advertising
the protection of the First Amendment, and the first prong of the Central
Hudson test would be cleared.
2. Is the Government Interest Substantial?
The interest in preventing children from taking up smoking is
certainly a substantial interest, given the harmful effects of smoking itself
and the greater governmental interest in protecting the welfare of child-
ren. " Generally, the Supreme Court has recognized that suppressing
demand for activities that are detrimental to "the health, safety, and welfare
of its citizens" qualifies as a substantial government interest,01 so a court
would almost certainly find the interest asserted here substantial.
3. Does the Regulation Directly Advance the Interest?
It is this element of the Central Hudson test that would appear to pose
some difficulty for a ban on Joe Camel advertising, since studies have yet
to establish any direct causal link between advertising and an increase in
cigarette consumption, nor has Joe Camel been conclusively shown to have
the effect of causing children to smoke. However, the Court in Posadas
showed significant deference to the legislative judgment that advertising
99. See Gostin & Brandt, supra note 69, at 905.
100. See generally Erznoznik v. City of Jacksonville, 422 U.S. 205 (1975).
101. See, e.g., Posadas de P.R. Assoc. v. Tourism Co. of P.R., 478 U.S. 328, 341-42
(1986).
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increased demand for gambling among Puerto Rican residents. "[T]he
Puerto Rico Legislature obviously believed ... that advertising of casino
gambling aimed at the residents of Puerto Rico would serve to increase the
demand for the product advertised. We think the legislature's belief is a
reasonable one."'" Indeed, the Posadas Court opined that the mere fact
of litigating against a ban is probative of the belief (of the litigant) that the
advertising will increase demand for a product. 3 The courts allow
similar deference to FTC findings of fact, upholding them unless they are
not supported by evidence. 1" A court would likely find, therefore, that
a ban on Joe Camel would directly advance the interest of preventing
children from starting to smoke.
4. Is the Regulation No More Broad Than is Necessary?
The requirement of this prong of the Central Hudson test is not, as
has been indicated, that the regulation be the least restrictive means of
achieving a desired governmental objective, but rather that there be a "fit
that is not necessarily perfect, but reasonable," or proportional to the
objective. 5 Incremental regulation of cigarette advertising has already
been attempted, 1"6 and while it is conceivable that other means short of a
ban could be used, the Court has said "[w]e think it is up to the legislature
to decide whether or not such a 'counterspeech' policy would be as effec-
tive.'
I07
It is important to note that a ban on Joe Camel advertising would not
prevent R.J. Reynolds from speaking out on issues related to cigarette
smoking, nor would it even prevent them from advertising just as heavily
for Camel cigarettes as they do now. The only effect would be to remove
from the "stream of commercial information' 0 8 an ad campaigu demon-
strated to primarily appeal to children and adolescents. While there can be
no doubt that this is a selective regulation, the Court in Posadas was faced
with a situation where only a certain type of advertising for casino
102. Id.
103. Id.
104. FTC v. Indiana Fed'n of Dentists, 476 U.S. 447, 454 (1986).
105. See Board of Trustees v. Fox, 492 U.S. 469, 480 (1989).
106. Tobacco Education & Child Protection Act, H.R. 3614, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. §3
(1993) (latest version of earlier Tobacco Control & Health Protection Act); H.RL 5041, 101st
Cong., 2d Sess. (1990); H.R. 1493, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. (1989); H.R. 1532, 100th Cong.,
1st Sess. (1987); H.R. 1272, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. (1987); Public Health Cigarette Smoking
Act of 1969, 15 U.S.C. § 1335 (1988) (effective Jan. 2, 1971); Comprehensive Smokeless
Tobacco Health Education Act of 1986, 15 U.S.C. § 1333, §§ 4401-08 (1988).
107. Posadas, 478 U.S. at 344.
108. Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425
U.S. 748, 772 (1976).
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gambling-that aimed at Puerto Rican residents-was banned, while
advertising for exactly the same gambling was allowed, as long as it was
aimed at tourists. Indeed, if a general ban on cigarette advertising were
sought on the theory that it appealed to children, that might serve to
weaken the argument that the means sought were proportional to the ends
desired, since a significantly greater amount of speech-speech that has not
been linked as greatly to children as has Joe Camel-would be banned.
Further, this would have the less desirable (and certainly more constitution-
ally burdensome) effect of inhibiting the dissemination of information about
cigarette smoking to adults, including those who may want to receive
information about lower-tar and lower-nicotine brands, and to expectant
mothers, who may not find out about the harmful effects of tobacco as
easily without the advertising.
CONCLUSION
A ban on Joe Camel advertising is within the statutory power of the
FTC pursuant to its power to regulate unfair advertising practices. It would
also withstand constitutional scrutiny under the Central Hudson test for
evaluating regulations on commercial speech. Further, given the objective
of reducing demand for cigarettes by keeping children from starting to
smoke, a selective ban on Joe Camel advertising is preferable constitution-
ally to a more general ban on cigarette advertising, because it will not
prevent the dissemination of advertising and information about cigarettes
generally, but will instead focus solely on a particular ad campaign which
has been shown to hold greater appeal for children than it does for adults.
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